



Shifting Gears

VicOne 2025 Automotive
Cybersecurity Report



Exploring the rapidly evolving landscape of automotive cybersecurity, this report identifies the forces shaping the future of mobility as the automotive industry shifts into high gear and ventures into new horizons. Our in-depth analysis reveals where the industry is headed, and which threats lurk along the path to innovation.

A New Digital Frontier

The automotive industry is evolving with software-defined vehicles (SDVs) and AI-driven innovations, creating unprecedented opportunities — and risks.

Rising Financial Impact

In 2024, automotive cyberattacks resulted in over US\$22 billion in estimated financial losses from ransomware, data breaches, and operational disruptions.

Emerging Vulnerabilities

Our decade-spanning analysis reveals that 83% of automotive vulnerabilities were found on onboard or in-vehicle systems. Meanwhile, fresh challenges are surfacing in electric vehicle (EV) charging, operating systems, and fleet management.

AI: A Double-Edged Sword

While AI enhances in-car features and operational efficiency, it also introduces risks that challenge traditional security methods, such as prompt injection and compromised training data.

EV Charging Challenges

Rapid EV adoption has exposed critical weaknesses in charging infrastructure — from unsecure payment protocols to outdated communication standards — potentially affecting both vehicles and power grids.

Underground Activity

Cybercriminals are leveraging dark and deep web channels to exchange sophisticated exploit techniques and stolen vehicle data, raising the stakes for automotive manufacturers (OEMs) and consumers alike.

This report dives into these emerging trends and data points, offering actionable insights and strategies to safeguard the future of connected mobility.

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The page features a vertical split design. The left half is dark with a blurred image of a car's rear lights. The right half is light blue with large, overlapping white and light blue circles. A large, vibrant red circle is partially visible on the left, overlapping the dark area.

CHAPTER 1

Threat Landscape Review

Amid further advancements, the automotive industry in 2024 faced more than 200 reported cybersecurity incidents and a record-breaking surge in discovered vulnerabilities. At the same time, cyberattacks continued to evolve, exposing emerging threats and attack vectors. We highlight key trends and industry shifts that will shape the road ahead by analyzing these developments alongside a decade's worth of data.

Automotive Cybersecurity Incidents in 2024

The automotive industry is undergoing a gradual but steady shift, shaped by technological advancements and the increasing complexity of modern vehicles — while also contending with emerging threats as well as persistent ones that have long plagued the industry.

To map these evolving risks, we conducted an extensive analysis across multiple sources, including research blogs, industry publications, conference presentations, GitHub repositories, vendor security advisories, underground forums, and cybersecurity discussions. Using targeted automotive-specific keywords — ranging from vehicle components to major car brands — we systematically tracked cybersecurity incidents and product security vulnerabilities.

Our findings highlight consistent ransomware attacks, a notable rise in estimated financial losses from cyberattacks, and an increasing propensity for vehicle hacking among security researchers and threat actors alike. These insights underscore the urgent need for enhanced security measures to protect vehicles and the broader automotive ecosystem from evolving risks.

Key Cybersecurity Trends in the First Half of 2024

We recorded over a hundred automotive cybersecurity incidents in the first half of 2024. Some of these were linked to advisories issued by Trend Zero Day Initiative™ (ZDI) based on the results of the first-ever Pwn2Own Automotive vulnerability discovery contest, which VicOne hosted with Trend ZDI in January 2024. The event uncovered multiple automotive zero-day vulnerabilities across four categories: Tesla, EV chargers, in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems, and automotive operating systems. (In another section, we revisit the findings from that event and provide preliminary highlights of its most recent iteration, Pwn2Own Automotive 2025.)

Numerous cyberattacks on IT systems, ransomware incidents, and vehicle recalls also occurred in the first few months of 2024.

From March to June, attacks on cloud and back-end services increased, while vulnerabilities in EV charging infrastructure and related social engineering attacks — such as denial of charging, vehicle accident exploits, and over-the-air (OTA) update threats — were more frequently observed.

The automotive industry also faced ransomware attacks in the first half of 2024, with groups like 8Base, Cactus, and Play making headlines with their disruptive activities. But it was the BlackSuit ransomware group that dealt the heaviest blow with its attack on CDK Global, causing widespread disruption to dealerships across North America.¹




Figure 1. Distribution of automotive cybersecurity incidents in the first half of 2024 by affected system or component

Data Breaches and Product Recalls in the Second Half of 2024

July to September 2024 saw several large-scale recalls due to software and hardware defects and cybersecurity concerns. Meanwhile, dealerships and other sectors of the automotive supply chain continued to face ransomware attacks and data breaches.

The last quarter of 2024 did not end quietly for the automotive industry. A few well-known automotive companies experienced data breaches, some of which were claimed by ransomware groups as part of their campaigns.² Alongside these were incidents of battery management system (BMS) recalls, IVI system vulnerabilities, EV charging infrastructure security issues, and incidents related to advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) failures. This shift is interesting because, while past concerns focused on hardware-level vulnerabilities, modern attacks increasingly target onboard vehicle systems, cloud infrastructure, and vehicle control mechanisms.




Figure 2. Distribution of automotive cybersecurity incidents in the second half of 2024 by affected system or component

Overall, the most reported incidents were related to IT systems, primarily involving data breaches and ransomware attacks. These were followed by IVI system and EV charging incidents, which consisted of vulnerabilities and exploits identified by researchers attempting to hack into these systems.

Predominant Threats in 2024

From the analyzed set of 215 incidents in 2024, we categorized each based on attack type and associated threats. This approach provided insights into the most prevalent threats over the past year.




Figure 3. Most prevalent automotive cybersecurity threats in 2024 based on analyzed incidents

Among all incidents, **cloud and back-end vulnerabilities** were the most frequent attack vectors. We found that these incidents typically involved the following:

- **Ransomware attacks:** Groups such as Cactus, LockBit, Play, and 8Base targeted OEMs, dealerships, and supply chains in the past year. Cactus, for example, had been known to exploit vulnerabilities in VPN appliances to gain system access.³
- **Data breaches:** Some incidents exposed sensitive information as a result of hacking or internal mishandling, affecting many brands. One of the most impactful incidents involved an auto parts manufacturer. The attack was part of a larger compromise of a cloud provider's servers, affecting over a hundred companies.⁴
- **Social engineering and phishing attacks:** A concerning trend emerged where cybercriminals began targeting EV owners through QR code phishing aka quishing.⁵ This technique involves placing fraudulent QR codes on EV charging stations, leading users to malicious websites designed to steal personal and financial information.

Vehicle hijacking, supply chain vulnerabilities, keyless entry exploits, and vehicle electronics virtualization attacks mostly involved **onboard systems and OTA vulnerabilities**. Examples of these incidents include:

- **IVI exploits:** During Pwn2Own Automotive 2024, researchers successfully executed exploits to compromise the Sony XAV-AX5500, Alpine Halo9, and Tesla IVI systems.⁶ Such exploits could enable attackers to steal in-car personally identifiable information (PII) and intercept data via Bluetooth protocol vulnerabilities.
- **Keyless entry and vehicle security breaches:** Attacks like the "Game Boy" hack used devices capable of intercepting signals, such as Flipper Zero or other devices disguised to mimic ordinary items, to gain access into vehicles. Two OEMs had been frequent targets of such attacks in recent years as some of their vehicles lacked engine immobilizers that could have prevented unauthorized access and theft. In 2024, the security measures that both companies implemented proved effective, leading to a sharp decline in car theft cases.⁷

Most of the third-party integration risk incidents that we identified involved EV charging, underscoring how this aspect of the automotive ecosystem was a frequent attack target in 2024. Threats impacted both public charging networks and home charging units, posing significant security risks. (We explore in more detail how EV charging is shaping the threat landscape in another section.) Here are some notable examples of these incidents:

- **Denial-of-charging attacks:** Preventing charging stations from supplying power or disrupting vehicle charging.
- **Remote code execution (RCE) and privilege escalation vulnerabilities:** Found in Autel MaxiCharger, JuiceBox, ChargePoint, WolfBox E40, and eCharge Controllers.
- **Social engineering and protocol exploits:** Security researchers⁸ identified vulnerabilities in protocols such as Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), which is widely used for communication between EV charging stations and central management systems. These vulnerabilities could be exploited to disrupt charging operations, steal energy, or access sensitive user data.

Some third-party integration and virtualization incidents involved **ADAS risks**, where vulnerabilities in external software or components created potential entry points for attackers to manipulate or disrupt critical driver assistance functions. We outline some of these incidents below:

- **Software misjudgments and consequent recalls:** Autonomous driving systems experienced multiple accidents, recalls, and investigations. In some of these cases, the software made misjudgments that led to accidents stemming from their AI misinterpreting their surroundings.^{9, 10, 11, 12}
- **Adversarial attacks:** Several studies have been conducted to test whether radar, lidar, and camera signals can be manipulated to create “hallucinations” of sorts and trigger false detection.
- **Vehicle virtualization risks:** Increased adoption of containerized platforms and automotive operating systems means that security flaws could enable remote control over vehicle operations or ADAS functions. Security researchers, for example, identified significant vulnerabilities in a well-known automotive company’s web portal that could be exploited to remotely control various vehicle functions.¹³

Regional Distribution of Incidents

We analyzed the regional distribution of the 215 automotive cybersecurity incidents in 2024 by identifying the location of the targeted entity in each case. We categorized cases where the impact extended beyond a specific branch or subsidiary — affecting vehicles on a global scale or disrupting a company’s worldwide operations — as “global.”

Most incidents occurred in the Americas, primarily in North America, with the US accounting for the majority. Europe followed, with Germany and the UK reporting the highest numbers, while Asia ranked third, led by China. These trends aligned with the locations of the world’s major automotive production hubs.




Figure 4. Distribution of automotive cybersecurity incidents in 2024 by region

The high percentage of “global” incidents highlights the interconnected nature of the automotive industry: Vulnerabilities and cyberattacks have the potential of dealing widespread impact that could transcend borders. This could also relate to the persisting prevalence of supply chain threats and vulnerabilities. Multiple incidents have shown that attacks on IT infrastructure, third-party software, and automotive components can lead to ransomware infections, data breaches, or security flaws affecting manufacturers and their ecosystems. This also emphasizes the critical role of cybersecurity in addressing and preventing issues before they become fully realized threats.

The Rise and Transformation of Automotive Vulnerabilities

In recent years, the automotive industry has witnessed a significant rise in cybersecurity threats, likely influenced by the increasing vulnerabilities in both hardware and software components. Shifting trends accompany this rise, revealing areas of concern for automotive cybersecurity.

We reviewed automotive-related Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) published over the past decade or so — specifically, from 2014 to 2024 — to identify the most vulnerable components and the most prominent threats associated with these vulnerabilities.




Figure 5. Number of automotive vulnerabilities published each year from 2014 to 2024




Figure 6. Distribution of automotive vulnerabilities published each year from 2022 to 2024 by affected system or component

Looking back at the automotive-related CVEs published in recent years, chipset vulnerabilities have become the dominant discovery. Chipset vulnerabilities have grown substantially, accounting for 50.9% of reported automotive vulnerabilities in 2024. This trend highlights concerns such as backdoors, microarchitectural attacks, and side-channel exploits.

Operating system vulnerabilities, which were rarely reported in the past, now make up 20.2% of reported cases in 2024, particularly in vehicle-specific platforms like Android Auto, QNX, and Linux.

EV charging infrastructure has also emerged as a new attack surface, with vulnerabilities jumping significantly in number from 2023 to 2024. Threats in this area include authentication loopholes, malicious charging stations, and unauthorized access risks.

IVI systems have shown increasing security risks, accounting for 5.5% of vulnerabilities in 2024, primarily due to RCE and API weaknesses.

Fleet management system (FMS) vulnerabilities have garnered attention, maintaining a consistent share of reported vulnerabilities in 2023 and 2024. These indicate an increased focus on large-scale vehicle control mechanisms, where hackers exploit centralized fleet management systems to compromise entire networks of vehicles. (In another section, we explore FMS risks through a study we conducted on exposed systems.)

Vulnerable Domains in the Automotive Ecosystem

To get a better understanding of the impact of these vulnerable components, we look into where these vulnerabilities lie in the vehicle ecosystem. Extending our analysis to the past decade reveals how vulnerabilities shift and rise within the automotive ecosystem.




Figure 7. Number of domain-related automotive vulnerabilities published each year from 2014 to 2024




Figure 8. Published vulnerabilities per domain in 2024

Onboard (in-vehicle software and hardware architecture) refers to all systems and components within the vehicle itself. The onboard domain continued to be the primary target of cyberattacks, representing 83.0% of all reported cases from 2014 to 2024 and 77.5% of all vulnerabilities in 2024. This domain was dominated by chipset vulnerabilities, followed by operating system and ECU vulnerabilities:

- **Chipset vulnerabilities** led with 67.4% of onboard cases, demonstrating ongoing hardware security concerns over the past decade.
- **Operating system vulnerabilities** accounted for 8.8% of onboard cases, particularly affecting Linux-based automotive platforms.
- **ECU weaknesses** contributed to 0.8% of onboard vulnerabilities, reflecting security flaws in vehicle control modules.

Cloud (cloud-driven vehicle services and back-end systems) encompasses the cloud-based infrastructure, which includes vulnerabilities in IT systems, mobile or vehicle apps, and EV charging. With the growing integration of vehicle-to-cloud (V2C) communication, cloud vulnerabilities have shown a relatively steady increase since 2019, with spikes in 2022 and 2024 (an 81.7% increase from 2023). The expansion of back-end IT infrastructure has made cloud-based systems a significant attack surface for cybercriminals.

Development (development tools and processes) represents the foundation for building and maintaining SDV software, covering tools, workflows, and methodologies. Security concerns in software development started to appear with some consistency in the vehicle ecosystem in 2022, and they continued in 2024. This is indicative of a combination of several movements: the introduction of AI-driven development tools, an industry shift toward full SDVs, and attacks on continuous-integration-and-continuous-deployment (CI/CD) pipeline tools in recent years.

From Vulnerabilities to Threats

After identifying the most vulnerable domains within the automotive ecosystem, we examined how these vulnerabilities — designs or flaws capable of producing unexpected behaviors — translated into threats — systemic exposures to risk. A review of data from the past decade revealed that significant shifts in threat trends surfaced only in recent years, driven by rapid industry advancements and the integration of more sophisticated vehicle technologies. The number of discovered vulnerabilities continued to rise, with certain types of threats becoming increasingly prominent.

Supply chain threats, in particular, accounted for more than half of all recorded cases over the past decade, with third-party integration and vehicle hijacking threats following at significantly lower percentages. This trend underscored that the supply chain emerged as one of the most vulnerable aspects of the automotive industry.




Figure 9. Number of vulnerabilities associated with automotive cybersecurity threats published each year from 2014 to 2024

The following threats have shown significant growth in recent years and continue to pose risks to manufacturers, suppliers, and consumers alike:

- **Supply chain threats:** The rise in chipset vulnerabilities has contributed significantly to supply chain security risks. High-profile incidents, such as the SolarWinds breach, have demonstrated the potential severity of software supply chain compromises in the automotive industry. As modern vehicles rely heavily on complex software integrations, ensuring security across all suppliers is crucial.
- **Vehicle hijacking threats:** Vulnerabilities in IVI and operating systems have made vehicle hijacking a growing concern for fleet operators as well as consumers. Vehicle hijacking is performed primarily through the exploitation of weaknesses in vehicle communication mechanisms such as the CAN (Controller Area Network) bus and wireless attack surfaces, enabling attackers to gain unauthorized control over vehicles. In 2024, reported vulnerabilities related to vehicle hijacking substantially increased from 2023.
- **Third-party integration threats:** As the automotive industry continues to adopt cloud services and third-party software integrations, the associated cybersecurity risks have expanded. In 2024, third-party integration vulnerabilities significantly increased from 2023, underscoring the industry's increasing reliance on APIs and external cloud platforms, which present new entry points for attackers.
- **Keyless entry threats:** Wireless authentication mechanisms have remained a persistent target for cybercriminals. After a period of low activity, keyless entry vulnerabilities increased, peaking in 2022 before declining slightly in 2023. Despite this fluctuation, relay attacks and RFID-based exploits aimed at unauthorized vehicle access continue to pose security risks. As vehicle manufacturers enhance security measures, cybercriminals are expected to adapt their techniques, keeping keyless entry systems a critical area of concern.

Overview of Cyberattacks in 2024

After analyzing the distribution of incident cases and vulnerabilities, we now turn to the impact of cyberattacks on the automotive industry. Unlike in the previous section on incidents, cyberattacks identified here targeted the IT systems of automotive companies, with some attacks likely going unreported. Our data — gathered from various sources, including underground forums and published news reports — showed a total of 297 cyberattacks on the industry.

Target Entity and Regional Distribution

Most cyberattacks targeted IT infrastructure, through ransomware attacks that led to data breaches and significant financial losses. We analyzed these attacks by target entity and observed that suppliers, dealers, and retailers were the most frequently targeted, highlighting their critical role in the automotive ecosystem and their appeal to threat actors.



Figure 10. Distribution of automotive cyberattacks in 2024 by target entity

The regional distribution of cyberattacks showed that the Americas continued to experience the highest number of incidents, followed by Europe and Asia. Overall, the regional targeting of cyberattacks remained relatively stable. However, in 2024, the proportion of reported attacks in Asia saw a slight increase, while Europe experienced a slight decline.




Figure 11. Distribution of automotive cyberattacks from 2022 to 2024 by region

The Soaring Cost of Cyberattacks

The rising impact of cyberattacks on the automotive industry is significant, particularly in terms of financial losses and operational disruptions.

To estimate the cost of automotive cyberattacks and illustrate the growth of their impact over the years, we devised a formula that considered three key cost factors:

- **Ransomware damage** represents the cost of a ransomware attack. This factors in the affected organization's size, the attacker's ransom demand, and historical data on attack patterns.
- **Data leakage** represents the cost of a data breach, particularly concerning PII. This is calculated based on the volume of compromised data (e.g., number of customer records) and the file size (in gigabytes) reportedly involved in the breach.
- **System downtime** represents the financial impact of operational disruptions caused by an attack. This is determined by considering the affected organization's revenue and the number of days its operations were halted.

These factors account for tangible costs related to technology and operations but do not include intangible costs such as branding, public relations, sales, and marketing efforts required to deal with the aftermath of an attack.

From 2022 to 2024, the total cost of automotive cyberattacks surged from US\$1.0 billion to US\$22.5 billion, reflecting the automotive industry's growing appeal as a lucrative target for cybercriminals. In 2024, the sharp increase in costs was largely driven by data leakage and PII exposure, amounting to US\$20.0 billion (with US\$1.9 billion from system downtime and US\$538.2 million from ransomware damage making up the remainder). Notably, several major automotive companies experienced significant data breaches in the latter part of the year, contributing to the substantial financial impact.

Cost	2022	2023	2024
Data leakage	\$4.0M	\$9.7B	\$20.0B
System downtime	\$802.7M	\$2.5B	\$1.9B
Ransomware damage	\$242.8M	\$523.6M	\$538.2M
Total	\$1.0B	\$12.8B	\$22.5B

Table 1. Estimated cost of cyberattacks from 2022 to 2024 in US dollars

Connecting the Dots: The 2025 Threat Landscape and Key Recommendations


Automotive cybersecurity is rapidly evolving, with emerging threats targeting supply chains, cloud systems, and in-vehicle technologies. Analyzing these trends collectively provides a clearer understanding of the shifting risk landscape and the urgency of proactive security measures:

- **The potential of supply chain vulnerabilities for large-scale incidents:** While supply chain vulnerabilities are widespread, they have not resulted in large-scale incidents, likely due to the complexity of executing such attacks. However, as dependencies in the automotive ecosystem increase, these vulnerabilities pose a growing risk that requires proactive mitigation.
- **The link between vulnerabilities and real-world incidents:** The correlation between documented vulnerabilities (CVE data) and real-world cybersecurity incidents suggests that attackers are actively exploiting known weaknesses, particularly those enabling vehicle hijacking and infotainment system breaches. This trend highlights the urgency for automakers to address security gaps before they can be exploited on a larger scale.
- **Cloud and back-end platforms under siege:** Cloud and onboard vehicle systems remain the most frequently targeted attack surfaces. As they store and process critical data, they are prime targets for cybercriminals seeking unauthorized access, ransomware deployment, or data breaches. While the number of reported vulnerabilities might not fully capture this trend, the steady rise in related security flaws underscores the need to secure these systems as vehicle connectivity expands.
- **A high-value industry target:** The automotive industry remains an attractive target for cyberattacks due to its increasing connectivity, high financial stakes, complex supply chains, and valuable data. These factors, combined with the challenge of securing modern vehicles, continue to drive cybercriminal interest.

Overall, automotive cybersecurity threats are shifting. While past concerns primarily focused on hardware-level vulnerabilities, modern attacks increasingly target onboard vehicle systems, cloud infrastructure, and vehicle control mechanisms. To mitigate these evolving risks, automakers must prioritize comprehensive security strategies that encompass real-time monitoring, vulnerability management, and proactive defense measures.

To effectively counter emerging threats, automakers must adopt a proactive and multilayered cybersecurity strategy. The following recommendations outline key measures to enhance security across supply chains, in-vehicle systems, connected platforms, and software development practices. (We cover broader recommendations for the automotive industry in a separate section at the end of this report.)

- **Strengthen supply chain security.** With supply chain threats accounting for 69% of recorded cases from 2014 to 2024, automakers must:
 - Enforce rigorous supplier security evaluations.
 - Implement software bills of materials (SBOMs) to track software dependencies.
 - Secure firmware and hardware development processes against potential threats.
- **Enhance in-vehicle security.** To mitigate risks associated with onboard systems, automakers must:
 - Implement secure boot mechanisms to prevent unauthorized firmware modifications.
 - Conduct continuous security assessments and vulnerability scans.
 - Strengthen firmware integrity verification methods.
- **Secure connected and cloud-based systems.** As vehicle connectivity grows, automakers must:
 - Adopt a zero trust architecture (ZTA) to secure vehicle-cloud data exchanges.
 - Ensure robust end-to-end encryption in cloud communication.
 - Enhance API security to prevent unauthorized third-party access.
- **Improve software development security.** To reduce security risks in automotive software development, automakers must:
 - Implement secure software development lifecycle (SDLC) practices.
 - Restrict access to testing and diagnostic tools.
 - Conduct continuous security assessments throughout the software update cycle.



CHAPTER 2

Industry Trends

As AI, ADAS technologies, EV charging, SDVs, and regulatory frameworks evolve, so do cybersecurity threats — and the industry's approach to combating them. In this section, we examine how these advancements are reshaping risks, from AI-driven attack surfaces to vulnerabilities in charging infrastructure and autonomous systems. By analyzing the related trends, we highlight the shifting dynamics of automotive cybersecurity and the challenges that lie ahead.

AI-Driven Transformation: Technological Advances and Security Risks

The integration of AI in modern vehicles is reshaping mobility, ushering in an era of voice-assisted driving, autonomous navigation, and other conveniences. However, alongside these advancements come new security risks, especially in vehicles where safety is paramount. While AI-driven innovations continue to transform the automotive industry, they also introduce complex cybersecurity challenges that warrant attention.

AI Deployment in Automotive Systems

AI can be deployed in automotive systems in two ways: local and cloud-based. Local AI models are primarily used for voice assistants and real-time translation, with ADASs being the second most common application. Meanwhile, cloud AI models work alongside local models in real-world applications, connecting to OEM systems to provide new in-car experiences and services.

Aspect	Local AI models	Cloud AI models
Performance	Low latency, limited by device hardware	Higher latency, virtually unlimited computational power
Scalability	Restricted to device capabilities	Highly scalable with cloud infrastructure
Latency	Minimal, suitable for real-time applications	Higher, although improving with network advancements
Internet dependency	Not required, can operate offline	Requires stable internet connection
Data privacy	Enhanced privacy with on-device processing	Potential risks necessitate robust security measures
Model updates	Requires device-specific updates	Centralized updates, easier to manage and deploy

Table 2. Comparison of local and cloud AI models in automotive systems

Local and cloud-based models each present unique challenges. While hybrid approaches combine the strengths of both, they also increase system complexity and amplify security concerns.

As AI integrates deeper into automotive systems, cybercriminals will refine their attack strategies, exploiting weaknesses in AI processing, training data integrity, and software frameworks. The industry now faces a critical challenge: securing AI-driven innovations without compromising on safety or performance.

AI Integration's Heightened Risks of Data Leakage and Compromise

One of the most pressing concerns with AI integration in automotive systems is the risk of unauthorized access. Poorly designed plug-ins might grant unintended permissions, leading to potential data leaks or system compromises. Similarly, if AI-generated outputs are not carefully managed, they could expose sensitive information, further increasing security vulnerabilities. The risk of AI systems operating beyond their intended functions — either through misconfiguration or intentional manipulation — poses another challenge, potentially resulting in unintended operational consequences.

AI models also rely heavily on the quality and integrity of their training data. If trained on compromised or manipulated datasets, an AI system might exhibit unpredictable or malicious behaviors. Attackers can exploit these weaknesses through adversarial techniques, such as prompt injection, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, or even model evasion strategies. By targeting AI processing pipelines, threat actors can influence how AI responds to specific inputs, potentially overriding safety protocols or causing system failures.

AI Vulnerabilities as Gateways for Future Cyberattacks

Instead of relying solely on cloud-based systems, automakers are increasingly deploying AI models directly into vehicles to meet stringent requirements for low latency and reliable data transmission, particularly in autonomous vehicles. This shift enhances real-time functions such as sensor data analysis and driver-assistance decision-making by reducing the delays inherent in cloud-based systems. However, it also expands the attack surface and introduces new security risks.

One major concern is the reliance on specialized chip-based AI accelerators designed to handle complex workloads while operating within the vehicle's power constraints. Processors such as Qualcomm's Oryon CPU and Hexagon DSP enhance computing power for automated driving, in-car entertainment, and signal processing. While these chips offer significant performance advantages, their proprietary frameworks can introduce security blind spots.

Security flaws in AI processing software have already been exposed in real-world cases. In 2024, a high-severity vulnerability (CVE-2024-43047) was discovered in Qualcomm's FastRPC, a communication mechanism between the main processor and AI accelerators like the Hexagon DSP.¹⁴ Attackers were able to

manipulate this communication channel, enabling them to execute unauthorized code, potentially leading to **data breaches, AI system manipulation, and full vehicle compromise**.

A separate study revealed additional risks in **outdated AI components**.¹⁵ Even when devices were fully updated, attackers were able to exploit weak version control mechanisms to install older, vulnerable AI software, enabling unauthorized system access. This highlights a critical challenge for automotive AI security: ensuring that AI-driven vehicle systems not only receive regular updates but also prevent attackers from exploiting outdated software components.

When such vulnerabilities occur in the context of autonomous or connected vehicles, the consequences can be severe:

- **System integrity risks:** Cyberattacks targeting AI models could disrupt critical driving functions, such as braking, steering, or collision avoidance, endangering drivers and passengers.
- **Data privacy concerns:** Attackers with DSP-level access could intercept sensor data or user information, leading to privacy breaches.
- **DoS attacks:** Compromising the DSP could force system reboots, disable vital in-vehicle functions, or render safety features inoperable.

AI Assistants and the Rising Risk of Prompt Injection in Vehicles

AI-powered assistants and infotainment systems are becoming standard in modern vehicles, improving convenience and automation. However, these systems are vulnerable to **prompt injection attacks**, where hackers embed hidden instructions into AI inputs to manipulate responses or bypass security measures.

One of the most elusive forms of prompt injection involves invisible Unicode characters, symbols that exist in text but are not visible to the human eye. Attackers exploit these characters to disguise harmful commands, tricking AI systems into processing unauthorized actions without detection. Research has shown that this technique can be used to execute unauthorized commands, leak sensitive information, and bypass traditional security measures, making it a growing concern for AI-powered systems.¹⁶ This growing concern highlights the need for enhanced AI input validation and text sanitization in automotive systems.

- 1 While collecting documents to establish its knowledge database, the AI system unintentionally includes a document with malicious commands embedded using invisible Unicode characters.




Figure 12. Example of a Unicode prompt injection attack¹⁷

Another related risk involves the Trojan Source vulnerability (CVE-2021-42574), which allows attackers to reorder text in source code, creating visually misleading code that can be interpreted differently by the compiler.¹⁸ While the code might appear safe to human reviewers, it can hide malicious instructions that the system processes as legitimate. Although it is not always used to target AI models directly, Trojan Source underscores a broader issue: Invisible characters can be weaponized to manipulate code and data in ways that make attacks difficult to detect through normal review processes.

Real-world evidence of invisible Unicode attacks has been observed across multiple domains. In phishing campaigns, invisible characters break up keywords to foil spam filters; in software development, Trojan Source-style injections introduce hidden logic in codebases;¹⁹ and in AI chatbots, researchers have repeatedly forced models to reveal or ignore safety guidelines by inserting carefully placed Unicode patterns.²⁰

As more automakers adopt AI-assisted infotainment or semiautonomous features, invisible injection techniques could compromise the user experience or even system integrity. While large-scale attacks specifically targeting vehicles have not yet been publicly documented, experts see this as a logical evolution: The more intelligent and connected a system becomes, the more avenues exist for adversaries to exploit seemingly minor text-processing vulnerabilities.

Risks of Using AI in Security

Developing a generative AI (GenAI) application involves multiple stages, each presenting unique security risks. While AI enhances automation and intelligence, vulnerabilities can arise throughout the development process, potentially leading to data leakage, model manipulation, or system compromise. Below is an overview of the GenAI application development lifecycle and the security risks associated with each stage.

Stage	Process	Risk
Defining the scope: setting boundaries to prevent data exposure	Clearly outline the application's purpose, limitations, and security requirements. Define objectives to ensure the AI operates within safe and ethical constraints.	An unclear or undefined scope can lead to design flaws that might cause sensitive data to leak. Without clear boundaries and safeguards, data could be unintentionally exposed.
Selecting a model: ensuring reliability and security	Choose between using an existing AI model or developing a custom one. Evaluate models for performance, reliability, and compliance with security best practices.	Choosing a model from an unreliable source or using tampered training data (like poisoned datasets or hidden backdoors) poses significant threats. This can turn the AI model into a channel for major data breaches.
Adapting and customizing: preventing hidden manipulations	Enhance the model through fine-tuning, prompt engineering, human feedback, and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to align it with business needs.	Using contaminated training data or RAG components can unintentionally expose data. Manipulating the large language model (LLM) might allow harmful outputs, such as RCE commands, compromising data integrity.
Implementing the application: securing integrations and plug-ins	Integrate the AI model into the system with user-friendly interfaces, APIs, and plug-ins for smooth operation.	Unsecure plug-in designs, especially from vulnerable vendors, might grant excessive or risky permissions to agents. This can expose the system to attacks like cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site request forgery (CSRF), or server-side request forgery (SSRF), leading to potential data leaks.
Deploying and monitoring: continuous improvement with security in mind	Launch the application while continuously monitoring performance, collecting user feedback, and applying updates.	If security monitoring is insufficient, attackers might exploit unknown vulnerabilities over time. The lack of proactive risk management can lead to delayed responses to malicious AI manipulations or unauthorized data extractions.

Table 3. GenAI application development lifecycle and associated security risks




Figure 13. Security risks in the GenAI application development lifecycle and mitigation strategies²¹

These risks highlight the need for strong security measures, thorough evaluations, and continuous monitoring throughout the GenAI application development lifecycle to prevent vulnerabilities and protect data. Like many technologies, GenAI offers transformative benefits but also poses risks; striking the right balance is essential to fully harness its potential.

EV Charging Infrastructure: A Growing Cybersecurity Concern

As EV adoption accelerates, the security of EV charging infrastructure has become a critical concern. Vulnerabilities in charging networks, payment systems, and communication protocols — once overlooked — are now under increasing scrutiny. The expansion of public and workplace charging has widened the attack surface, making EV charging stations potential entry points for cyberthreats. Zero-day vulnerability discovery initiatives like Pwn2Own Automotive have also exposed many security flaws in charging systems, highlighting risks that both manufacturers and users might have underestimated. Indeed, the demand for reliable and secure charging infrastructure has become more urgent than ever.




Figure 14. EV charging locations²²

A Complex Charging Ecosystem

The EV charging ecosystem involves multiple stakeholders, including **e-mobility service providers (eMSPs)**, which manage payments; **e-roaming platforms**, which connect different EV charging networks; **charging point operators (CPOs)**, which maintain stations; and **distribution system operators (DSOs)**, which ensure grid stability. The complexity of this ecosystem introduces security gaps, with vulnerabilities ranging from weak authentication protocols to outdated software in charging stations.




Figure 15. EV charging ecosystem

To mitigate the risks, industry groups have developed security-focused protocols and standards. For example, because of varying payment system requirements and regulations, previous versions of Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) did not fully support all aspects of payment processing, potentially exposing charging systems to cyberthreats. Version 2.1 of OCPP was released, in January 2025, partly to address this limitation.²³




Figure 16. OCPP payment process²⁴

In addition to OCPP, the industry is integrating ISO 15118, a standard that supports Plug & Charge functionalities and enhances communication between EVs and charging infrastructure. ISO 15118 is particularly important in enabling vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interactions, through which EVs can exchange information with the grid, other vehicles, and surrounding infrastructure. This standard facilitates seamless data sharing and energy management, allowing features like vehicle-to-grid (V2G) and vehicle-to-home (V2H) to operate efficiently.

ISO 15118 closely aligns with the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer model, providing a structured approach to communication between EVs and charging stations:

- **Application layer:** Handles high-level services like Plug & Charge, user authentication, and secure data exchange.
- **Presentation layer:** Ensures data format standardization and encryption to protect sensitive user and vehicle information.
- **Session layer:** Manages sessions between EVs and charging stations, enabling features like session resumption.
- **Transport layer:** Uses TCP/IP for reliable data transfer between EVs and the charging infrastructure.

- Network layer: Defines IP addressing and routing protocols to facilitate communication across diverse networks.
- Data link layer: Governs data transfer over physical connections such as Ethernet or power line communication (PLC).
- Physical layer: Involves the hardware components like cables, connectors, and signals that establish the physical link between EVs and charging stations.

By leveraging the OSI model, ISO 15118 ensures that each communication layer operates independently yet collaboratively, enabling robust and secure interactions within the EV charging ecosystem. This modular approach supports V2X communication, ensuring compatibility and scalability as new technologies and features are introduced.

From Vehicles to Power Grids: The Expanding Cyber Risks of EV Charging

Recent research and real-world incidents highlight the cybersecurity risks associated with EV charging infrastructure. Without strong security measures, EV charging systems could become entry points for broader cyberthreats, potentially affecting both vehicles and power grids.

Over the past year, multiple cases exposed vulnerabilities in EV charging infrastructure. These cases ranged from simple exploits, such as remotely opening an EV's charging port, to more advanced threats, such as BrokenWire, which used radio frequency signals to disrupt communication between vehicles and chargers. In 2024, researchers developed V2GEvil, a tool designed to test V2G protocols, demonstrating how attackers could manipulate power lines and intercept communications to compromise EV charging networks.²⁵




Figure 17. V2GEvil targets the protocol stack defined by ISO 15118.²⁶

The potential impact of hacking an EV charging station is substantial. Nearly a decade ago, one of the most notorious cyberattacks on a Ukrainian power grid exposed how critical infrastructure could be compromised to cause large-scale disruptions. In a 2020 IEEE study titled “Public Plug-in Electric Vehicles + Grid Data: Is a New Cyberattack Vector Viable?”, researchers examined the link between EV charging infrastructure and power grid security. Their findings revealed that publicly accessible data on EV charging patterns and grid operations could be exploited to destabilize electrical grids.²⁷

Securing Every Step in the EV Charging Process

EV charging security extends far beyond regulatory compliance or robust hardware — it requires a thorough examination of every step in the charging process to mitigate emerging cyber risks.

Research has shown that attackers can **bypass network protections simply by exploiting the charging cable**. In one scenario, an attacker accesses hidden services (such as SSH or web configuration interfaces) on a DC fast charging station, potentially taking control of the station without ever reaching the private network.²⁸ This not only jeopardizes the station itself but also poses risks to back-end systems and, in extreme cases, could even destabilize portions of the power grid.

Similarly, the **BrokenWire attack** demonstrates how physical interfaces — often overlooked — can become entry points for cyberthreats.²⁹ It illustrates how an attack through the charging cable can introduce vulnerabilities that are ripe for exploitation, with attackers intercepting and manipulating critical charging parameters.

While these studies do not explore every technical nuance, they underscore that the EV charging threat landscape is evolving. Attackers might move beyond classic “juice jacking” data theft toward more intricate exploits aimed at commandeering charging infrastructure.

The increasing complexity and the expanding connectivity of the EV charging ecosystem introduce cybersecurity risks, including:

- **Data interception and breaches:** Attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive user data, including payment credentials and vehicle information, during communication between EVs and charging stations.

- **Unauthorized access to charging infrastructure:** Poorly secured charging stations or networks could allow attackers to manipulate charging sessions or disrupt services.
- **Grid manipulation via V2G:** Malicious actors could exploit vulnerabilities in V2G systems to destabilize the electrical grid, leading to power outages or overloads.
- **Firmware and software exploits:** Charging stations often rely on firmware updates, which, if compromised, could lead to system hijacking or data manipulation.
- **Physical layer attacks:** Hardware vulnerabilities in connectors or charging equipment could facilitate data theft or tampering.

To address these concerns, the industry should focus on securing every layer of the EV charging ecosystem through:

- **End-to-end encryption:** Ensuring all communication between EVs, charging stations, and back-end systems is encrypted to prevent unauthorized data access.
- **Secure authentication mechanisms:** Using protocols like ISO 15118 for Plug & Charge functionality, which incorporates cryptographic certificates to validate both EVs and charging stations.
- **Regular firmware updates:** Enforcing secure, signed updates to prevent exploitation of outdated systems.
- **Network segmentation:** Isolating EV charging networks from critical infrastructure to reduce the risk of cascading failures.
- **Standardization and testing:** Adopting and thoroughly testing protocols and standards like OCPP and ISO 15118 to address known vulnerabilities and ensure compliance with security best practices.

Autonomous Vehicles: Securing Driverless Mobility

As autonomous vehicles (AVs), commonly known as self-driving cars, become more prevalent, they offer enhanced safety and efficiency but also introduce new cybersecurity risks. These vehicles rely on complex, interconnected systems, making them potential targets for cyberattacks. With the advancement of automation, particularly in **Level 4 AVs** — which can operate without human intervention in designated areas — such as robotaxis and Tesla's Full Self-Driving (FSD) system, ensuring their security and resilience has become a critical challenge.

AVs depend on **sensors, cameras, GPS, radar, lidar, and advanced computing** to navigate. Unlike traditional vehicles, these systems minimize human oversight, making them more vulnerable to cyberthreats. Attackers could exploit weaknesses in these interconnected components to manipulate vehicle behavior, disrupt navigation, or even take remote control of vehicles.

From Rule-Based Systems to AI-Driven Security

Traditional **rule-based automation** in vehicles operates on fixed programming, making it predictable and susceptible to reverse engineering and exploitation if vulnerabilities are discovered. In response, the automotive industry is shifting toward **AI and machine learning-based security models**, which provide more adaptive and resilient defense against cyberthreats.

Tesla's FSD system exemplifies this transition. Unlike rule-based systems, FSD relies on **neural networks trained on vast datasets**, enabling it to learn and adapt over time. This adaptability makes it harder for attackers to develop universal exploits, as AI-driven systems continuously evolve, improving their ability to **detect and respond to emerging cyberthreats** in real time.

L4/L5 Autonomy and Multimodal AI Redefining the Vehicle Attack Surface

Level 4 or Level 5 (L4/L5) autonomy entails high to full automation, relying heavily on sensor fusion to integrate data from multiple sources and multimodal AI to process that information for decision-making. This dependence makes attacks on sensor integrity and the AI-driven decision-making processes particularly critical.

The following are key risks across aspects, AI systems, and external communications, each presenting unique challenges to autonomous operations. Protecting these components is essential to ensuring the safety and security of autonomous driving:

- **Front and rear short-range and long-range radar:** Radar jamming or spoofing can cause an AV to misinterpret its surroundings, potentially leading to collisions or unsafe driving maneuvers. Researchers have previously demonstrated such an attack, using various methods to jam an AV's radar.³⁰

- **Ultrasonic sensors and lidar:** Spoofing these sensors can create phantom objects or cause an AV to miss real obstacles, disrupting its perception of its immediate environment and compromising safe navigation. This directly affects the multimodal AI's input, leading to incorrect driving decisions. Researchers have demonstrated such an attack by creating an obstacle to stop a vehicle from parking in an empty spot and jamming sensors to do the opposite and cause the vehicle to fail to detect a real obstacle.³¹ Lidar can also be overwhelmed with "ghost" points, tricking an AV into emergency-braking or stopping for nonexistent objects.³²
- **Software, algorithms, and AI:** The complexity of ADAS software, especially with the integration of neural networks and machine learning for L4/L5 autonomy, introduces numerous vulnerabilities. These, in turn, introduce security risks such as **training data poisoning**, where attackers corrupt datasets, leading to faulty AI-driven decisions; **adversarial attacks**, where manipulated inputs trick the AI into misinterpreting data (e.g., placing tape on a speed limit sign to cause unsafe acceleration); and **algorithm exploitation**, which targets vulnerabilities in AI models and sensor fusion systems, potentially leading to miscalculations in vehicle perception and decision-making.
- **Cameras and infrared sensors:** Attacks targeting cameras, such as spoofing images or injecting false objects, and attacks targeting infrared sensors, such as interfering with object detection in challenging conditions, can directly mislead an AV's perception system. Since cameras are key components in most multimodal sensor suites, compromising them can severely degrade the AI's performance. Researchers have demonstrated this by projecting a fake stop sign for just 0.125 seconds on a billboard, causing an AV to brake unexpectedly in the middle of the road.³³
- **Geographic information science (GIS) and navigation:** Manipulating map data or real-time traffic information can cause an AV to make incorrect routing decisions or misinterpret its location. This is particularly relevant for L4/L5 autonomy, where accurate mapping is essential for safe and efficient navigation. In a controlled test, researchers fed false location and speed limit data to an AV's GPS, tricking it into taking a wrong highway exit and sharply decelerating at an unsafe location.³⁴ Similarly, fake traffic data — such as in the 99 phones Google Maps hoax, where a pile of smartphones created an artificial traffic jam — can reroute vehicles unnecessarily, disrupting normal traffic flow.³⁵

In addition to these attack surfaces, cloud infrastructure and V2X communication could introduce risks to ADAS technologies. While cloud vulnerabilities have a less immediate impact on real-time L4/L5 driving decisions than sensor and AI flaws, they still pose significant risks, such as remote control commands or data theft. For example, a 2022 telematics vulnerability allowed researchers to remotely unlock and start vehicles from multiple OEMs using only their vehicle identification numbers (VINs).³⁶ Similarly, V2X communication has the potential to enhance AV safety, but its limited deployment makes it a pressing cybersecurity concern.³⁷

The State of SDV Cybersecurity: Navigating Innovation and Risk

The transition to SDVs heralds a more connected, intelligent, and sustainable era of mobility. However, this transformation brings significant challenges, particularly in cybersecurity, software complexity, and regulatory compliance. The reliance of SDVs on OTA updates, cloud connectivity, and advanced in-vehicle systems necessitates a robust framework to manage risks while ensuring safety, privacy, and resilience. In this section, we revisit the same vulnerability data discussed previously to illustrate how threats to SDVs have evolved over time.

Prevalent SDV Cybersecurity Threats

In Table 4, we highlight the top SDV cybersecurity threats based on the number of published vulnerabilities associated with them from 2014 to 2024.

Threat type	Count
Supply chain threats	1,564
Third-party integration threats	308
Vehicle hijacking threats	295
Fleet-specific threats	44
Cloud and back-end threats	30
Network threats	27
Virtualization threats	3

Table 4. Top SDV cybersecurity threats based on the number of published vulnerabilities associated with them from 2014 to 2024

As can be surmised from traditional IT cyberattacks and the number of published vulnerabilities, the automotive supply chain remains a prime target because of its reliance on numerous suppliers, making it a persistent challenge to ensure robust and comprehensive cybersecurity measures. Our analysis of these automotive-related vulnerabilities underscores these issues, with **supply chain threats** ranking as the top threat type, at 1,564 cases. This highlights the complexity of securing an interconnected network of suppliers and third parties.

Third-party integration threats follow as the second most prevalent threat type, with 308 instances. This is largely due to the increasing reliance on external ecosystems — such as charging networks, smart home integrations, and fleet management platforms — which widen the vehicle attack surface. Weaknesses in these APIs or systems can serve as entry points for attackers, allowing them to compromise vehicles, steal data, or disrupt operations. The rapid adoption of EVs has magnified these risks, with charging network vulnerabilities adding to the urgency of addressing them.

With 295 documented vulnerabilities, **vehicle hijacking threats** are a significant concern that impacts vehicle control and safety. Attackers can exploit weaknesses in SDV software to take remote control of critical vehicle functions such as steering, braking, and acceleration, posing direct risks to passenger safety and public road security. Demonstrations of incidents involving compromised ECUs or communication channels leading to complete system takeovers highlight the severity of these threats.

Beyond these types of threats, the transition to advanced networking architectures, such as high-bandwidth Ethernet, introduces additional challenges. For example, improper implementation of authentication mechanisms such as MACsec or IPsec can leave network systems vulnerable to exploitation. Autonomy-specific risks are also a growing concern, as attackers can manipulate sensor data or machine learning models, causing autonomous vehicles to misinterpret their surroundings.

Decoding SDV Cybersecurity: A Four-Domain Approach to Threats

The breakdown of automotive vulnerabilities by SDV domain, as shown in Figure 18, provides critical insights into the evolution of security risks in SDVs. By examining this data, we can identify trends, pinpoint focus areas, and better understand the shifting threat landscape across the domains.




Figure 18. Distribution of automotive vulnerabilities published from 2014 to 2024 by SDV domain

The **onboard domain** accounts for most published vulnerabilities from the past decade (83%), driven by the increasing complexity of in-vehicle systems like ECUs, communication networks, and operating system platforms. This highlights the urgent need to implement security measures for critical vehicle functions, such as OTA updates and internal communication protocols.

The **cloud domain** has seen a significant rise in vulnerabilities in recent years, reflecting the growing dependence on cloud-based services for real-time data processing, feature deployment, and EV charging networks. This trend underscores the importance of securing cloud infrastructure and reliable vehicle-to-cloud communication.

Although the **development domain** represents a smaller share of overall vulnerabilities, risks in this area are particularly concerning. Flaws in development processes or tools can spread throughout the SDV ecosystem, emphasizing the need for secure coding practices and robust supply chain security.

Building on these trends, our analysis of zero-day vulnerabilities offers deeper insights into specific system and device-level threats. In 2024, we discovered **nine zero-day vulnerabilities**, which we summarize in Table 5, indicating the vulnerable system or device, threat type, and SDV domain associated with each vulnerability. Notably, all but one are in the onboard domain, with critical systems like safety-control mechanisms, communication protocols, and head units particularly vulnerable. Threats like third-party integration and vehicle hijacking underscore the need for automakers to perform rigorous testing and secure integration of third-party components to safeguard these systems effectively.

Vulnerable system/device	Threat type	SDV domain
Safety control system	Third-party integration threat	Onboard
Automotive booting system	Supply chain threat	Onboard
Dongle	Third-party integration threat	Onboard
Dongle with USB interface	Third-party integration threat	Onboard
Dongle with Wi-Fi interface	Third-party integration threat	Onboard
Communication protocol	Third-party integration threat	Onboard
Head unit	Vehicle hijacking threat	Onboard
Automotive CPU	Supply chain threat	Offboard
Autonomous system	Supply chain threat	Onboard

Table 5. Summary of the nine zero-day vulnerabilities discovered by VicOne in 2024, indicating the vulnerable system or device, threat type, and SDV domain associated with each vulnerability

Overall, the increasing complexity and connectivity of SDVs call for a holistic approach to security across all four domains, with this report serving as a guide in areas requiring further attention and proactive measures to mitigate emerging risks.

Future-Proofing SDVs: Predictions for the Year Ahead

Based on data from the past decade and insights from our 2024 cybersecurity threat analysis, we present the following predictions for the future of SDVs, outlining key cybersecurity events anticipated in 2025. (We cover broader predictions for the automotive industry in a separate section at the end of this report.)

Supply Chain Time Bomb: Hidden Vulnerabilities Crippling SDVs

Supply chain threats were identified as the most significant threat type over the past decade, with 1,564 documented vulnerabilities, 279 of which were published in 2024. Historical incidents have shown how vulnerabilities in critical components such as ECUs can lead to complete vehicle safety compromises, underscoring the pivotal role of the supply chain in SDV security.

2025 Threat Prediction

Supply chain attacks will continue to increase as malicious actors exploit vulnerabilities in third-party hardware and software components integrated into SDVs.

- Attackers will leverage unpatched vulnerabilities in third-party components to orchestrate large-scale data breaches.
- Malicious code embedded during production will serve as a backdoor for future remote exploits.

Vehicles Bricked via OTA Updates

While essential for SDVs, OTA updates will remain a critical attack vector if not properly secured. Historical trends show that unauthorized or malicious updates can disrupt vehicle functionality and jeopardize user safety.

2025 Threat Prediction

Vulnerabilities in OTA mechanisms will enable attackers to deliver malicious software updates or disrupt essential update processes.

- Unauthorized OTA updates will introduce malicious firmware, rendering vehicles inoperable.
- Attackers will use malicious updates to disable critical safety functions, posing significant risks to user safety.

Cloud Under Siege: SDV Back-End Systems Targeted

Over the past decade, 30 documented instances of vulnerabilities related to cloud infrastructure were identified, including two in 2024, reflecting its growing role in SDV operations. Compromises in cloud infrastructure have disrupted vehicle services, exposed sensitive data, and undermined V2C communications.

2025 Threat Prediction

With SDVs increasingly relying on cloud platforms for real-time data processing and software deployment, cloud-based systems will become prime targets for cyberattacks.

- Attackers will gain control over back-end cloud platforms, affecting multiple vehicles simultaneously.
- Data breaches from cloud systems will expose sensitive user data on a large scale.

Third-Party Apps Opening the Door to Cyberthreats

Third-party integration threats ranked as the second most significant threat type in 2024, as 103 of the 308 documented vulnerabilities over the past decade were published just last year. Breaches through third-party systems have disrupted fleet management operations, emphasizing the need for stricter integration protocols.

2025 Threat Prediction

Reliance on third-party applications — such as payment systems, smart home integrations, and charging networks — will continue to present significant cybersecurity risks.

- Vulnerabilities in third-party APIs will enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to vehicle systems.
- Compromised external applications will expose users' financial and personal information.

Autonomous Deception: Manipulating the Future of Driving

Autonomous systems remain highly susceptible to sensor data manipulation, as highlighted by our 2024 analysis and historical data. Attackers have demonstrated the ability to distort sensor inputs, leading to critical misjudgments in vehicle decision-making processes.

2025 Threat Prediction

Attackers will manipulate data from cameras, lidar, and other autonomous driving sensors to mislead vehicle decision-making processes.

- Vehicles will be misdirected by falsified road signs or manipulated sensor inputs.
- Malicious actors will alter sensor data to trigger critical system malfunctions.

Ransomware on Wheels: Locked Out and Left Vulnerable

Previous incidents have shown how ransomware poses a potent threat to both individual vehicles and fleet management systems. Centralized fleet operations, reliant on interconnected systems, are particularly vulnerable to large-scale ransomware campaigns.

2025 Threat Prediction

Ransomware attacks targeting SDVs and back-end management systems will increase in both frequency and sophistication.

- Attackers will lock vehicles or critical systems, demanding ransom for their restoration.
- Fleetwide ransomware attacks will disrupt logistics and ride-sharing services.

Network Takeover: Silent Sabotage Through Vehicle Ethernet Systems

Over the past decade, 27 vulnerabilities related to vehicle networking protocols were documented, with many stemming from high-bandwidth Ethernet architectures. The growing adoption of Ethernet-based communication in SDVs introduces new risks, particularly from inadequate implementation of encryption protocols such as MACsec and IPsec.

2025 Threat Prediction

As SDVs transition to Ethernet-based architectures, inadequate implementation of encryption protocols will leave systems exposed to exploitation.

- Attackers will perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks to intercept or manipulate communication data.
- Network intrusions will disrupt essential vehicle control functions.

Toward Compliance and Beyond: Automotive Cybersecurity Standards and Regulations

Standards and regulations such as the ISO series, UN R155, and UN R156 are shaping the automotive industry, guiding everything from vehicle design and manufacturing to market compliance and security strategies. However, as cyberthreats evolve and SDVs become more prevalent, a crucial question emerges: Are these standards and regulations keeping pace with emerging risks? This section examines current automotive cybersecurity standards and regulations, their impact on the industry, and whether updates are needed to address the rapidly shifting threat landscape.

Impact of Automotive Cybersecurity Standards and Regulations

The following highlights how certain standards and regulations have been designed to strengthen automotive cybersecurity and how they have influenced manufacturer practices and industry adaptation.

Improving Overall Safety

Traditional safety standards such as ISO 26262 (functional safety) and ISO 21448 (safety of the intended functionality, or SOTIF) have driven significant advancements in active and passive vehicle safety. However, as vehicles become increasingly connected and software-driven, new cybersecurity-focused standards and regulations — ISO/SAE 21434 (automotive cybersecurity risk management), ISO 24089 (software update engineering), UN R155 (cybersecurity management system, or CSMS), and UN R156 (software update management system, or SUMS) — have emerged to further strengthen cybersecurity defenses.

Impact: These standards and regulations raise the bar for secure vehicle design by requiring manufacturers to conduct threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) during development and implement best practices — such as robust protection measures, prompt reporting, and rapid patching — to mitigate high-level attack risks. While Pwn2Own Automotive demonstrates that automotive systems can still be breached, it also highlights how these standards and regulations compel manufacturers to establish proactive response mechanisms, deliver timely security updates, and reduce the risk of prolonged system compromises.

Enhancing Cybersecurity Measures

UN R155 mandates that automakers establish a cybersecurity management system (CSMS), ensuring cybersecurity is systematically managed throughout a vehicle's lifecycle. ISO/SAE 21434 complements this by requiring the integration of cybersecurity engineering practices at every stage of development. Meanwhile, UN R156 and ISO 24089 clearly define protocols for software updates and vulnerability patching, preventing manufacturers from handling security threats in a reactive, ad hoc manner.

Impact: The automotive industry's cybersecurity posture has markedly improved as a result of these standards and regulations. Technologies such as OTA updates, remote monitoring, and structured incident reporting channels have matured, enabling faster response times to threats. Although zero vulnerabilities cannot be guaranteed, manufacturers now generally react to threats and attacks with greater speed and urgency than in the past.

Implementing Safety by Design

"Safety by design" requires extensive safety testing, the involvement of experts in automotive functional safety and cybersecurity, and the establishment of systematic documentation and risk management processes — all of which significantly drive up R&D and production costs.

Impact: Some manufacturers express concerns over the substantial resource investments, extended development timelines, and the need for training at every tier of the supply chain. However, many acknowledge that, in the long run, compliance reduces the risk of major recalls and brand damage, making these expenditures an unavoidable but necessary investment in long-term security and reliability.

Facilitating Innovation and Technological Advancements

In response to stricter safety and cybersecurity requirements, many automakers have been shifting toward advanced designs, such as new electrical/electronic (E/E) architectures and high-performance domain controllers, and investing in AI, cloud management, and OTA technologies. These advancements enable manufacturers to meet ongoing compliance requirements and continuous update demands.

Impact: Some EV brands can now roll out security updates every few weeks, effectively aligning cybersecurity measures with consumer expectations for fast and seamless improvements. Rather than merely constraining innovation, standards and regulations are serving as catalysts for technological advancements, pushing automakers toward more secure, adaptable, and future-ready vehicle systems.

Strengthening Supply Chain Collaboration

UN R155 explicitly requires that the entire supply chain be integrated into the CSMS framework. It mandates that automakers ensure Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers also comply with cybersecurity standards and regulations throughout the design, development, and delivery of components — reinforcing shared security responsibility across the industry.

Impact: Initially, some small- and medium-sized suppliers struggled with increased pressure due to limited resources and technical capabilities. However, this challenge has spurred a move toward industrywide standardization, resulting in smoother information sharing and technology integration. In the long term, a more transparent supply chain helps mitigate hidden risks that previously arose from overlooking a supplier's cybersecurity practices.

Unifying Regional Standards

While UNECE member countries and regions such as Japan and the EU now enforce mandatory compliance with UN R155 and UN R156, the US continues to rely primarily on voluntary guidelines and China enforces its own rigorous national standards (GB). Such disparities mean varied approval and compliance processes for global automakers seeking to sell vehicles across multiple markets.

Impact: Navigating diverse standardizations and regulatory requirements increases compliance burdens, requiring automakers to adapt to different certification frameworks. However, many major manufacturers have aligned their cybersecurity practices with UNECE regulations, treating them as a de facto baseline for global compliance. Additionally, establishing higher cybersecurity benchmarks, both in standardization and regulatory compliance, from the outset can reduce the need for redundant testing and modifications across multiple markets, ultimately improving efficiency.

Reinforcing Environmental Sustainability

From emissions control to the push for electrification, standards and regulations have long been a driving force in the automotive industry. Similar to cybersecurity and software update standards and regulations, environmental policies emphasize continuous monitoring and adaptive responses to evolving challenges.

Impact: Manufacturers have taken a multifaceted approach to compliance, including accelerating EV development, implementing green manufacturing practices, restructuring supply chains, and lobbying for more flexible timelines. However, automakers continue to face challenges in balancing costs, advancing infrastructure, and aligning with diverse global policies, making standardization and regulatory adaptation an ongoing priority.

Should the Standards and Regulations Be Revised?

The discoveries at Pwn2Own Automotive, which exposed vulnerabilities in EV charging and in-vehicle systems, demonstrate that while standards and regulations have helped mitigate large-scale cybersecurity risks, there is still room for improvement.

Potential updates could include explicitly requiring third-party penetration testing, tightening criteria for classifying known vulnerabilities as “unacceptable risks,” and broadening the scope to encompass charging infrastructure within a comprehensive “connected car cybersecurity” framework. Just as crash tests and emissions standards are periodically updated, policies like UN R155 and UN R156 may also be revised to keep pace with technological advancements and evolving threats.

Regular updates would ensure that the industry remains adaptive to emerging cyberattack scenarios and that standards and regulations continue to be forward-looking in safeguarding connected, autonomous, and electric vehicles.

Key Established and Emerging Automotive Cybersecurity Standards and Regulations

In addition to existing standards and regulations, several new cybersecurity and safety standards and regulations are currently under development to address emerging threats in connected, autonomous, and electric vehicles. These upcoming standards and regulations will further influence vehicle security strategies, software integrity requirements, and compliance frameworks.

To illustrate their impact, we examine ISO 24882 — a forthcoming standard that defines cybersecurity engineering requirements for agricultural machinery and tractors — as a case study, highlighting how its implementation could shape cybersecurity measures, strengthen software integrity, and refine compliance requirement across the automotive industry at large.

ISO 24882: Cybersecurity as a Core Pillar Across the Agricultural and Automotive Industries

ISO 24882, officially titled “Agricultural Machinery and Tractors — Cybersecurity Engineering,” establishes a structured approach to managing cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle of agricultural machinery and tractors. The standard encompasses key aspects such as risk assessment, design and development, production, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning of E/E systems in these vehicles.

While ISO 24882 is designed for agricultural machinery, its principles — such as structured risk management, secure system design, and lifecycle cybersecurity measures — can serve as a reference for the broader automotive industry. As connected and software-driven technologies continue to shape both the agricultural and automotive industries, standardization and regulatory trends in one may foreshadow future cybersecurity expectations in the other.

Segment	Impact
Manufacturers	Automotive manufacturers will need to adapt their design, development, and production processes to meet the requirements of ISO 24882, potentially entailing significant investments in new technologies and expertise.
Suppliers	Suppliers will need to ensure that their systems and components meet the cybersecurity requirements of their customers, which are increasingly demanding compliance with ISO 24882 and other cybersecurity standards.
Dealers	Dealers will play a role in educating customers about cybersecurity and ensuring that vehicles are updated with the latest security patches and software.

Table 6. Potential impact of ISO 24882 on different segments of the automotive ecosystem

The convergence of smart transportation and smart agriculture has exposed standardization and regulatory gaps in cybersecurity governance. While UN R155, UN R156, and ISO/SAE 21434 focus on securing on-road vehicles, they leave uncertainties in areas where agricultural and automotive technologies intersect, such as autonomous farm equipment operating on public roads or farm logistics vehicles integrated into connected networks.

To address these gaps, the **Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)** introduces overarching cybersecurity requirements for all networked products in the EU, ensuring that connected devices, including smart tractors, meet baseline security standards. Meanwhile, **ISO 24882** fills a technical void for agricultural machinery, mirroring ISO/SAE 21434’s lifecycle approach but tailored for off-highway vehicles like tractors and other farm equipment.

ISO 24882 in Context: A Parallel Approach to Cybersecurity

The ongoing development of ISO 24882 marks a significant step toward formalizing cybersecurity standards for agricultural vehicles and autonomous farm machinery. However, it is part of a larger global effort to establish and update cybersecurity frameworks across the transportation and mobility sectors. By addressing unique vulnerabilities in off-road and connected agricultural equipment, ISO 24882 fills a critical standardization and regulatory gap and mirrors global trends in the US, UK, China, and beyond — where cybersecurity is increasingly embedded at every stage of a product’s lifecycle.

Ultimately, this alignment across diverse standards and regulations signals that cybersecurity has become an indispensable element of overall vehicle safety and compliance, setting a benchmark for future innovations in the automotive industry.

Standard or regulation	Implication	Country or region	Affected entities
New US rule: protecting America from connected vehicle technology from countries of concern	Restricts use of connected vehicle technology from certain countries to reduce cybersecurity risks	US	Automakers, suppliers, and technology providers using foreign connected vehicle systems and components
NHTSA: cybersecurity best practices for modern vehicles	Provides best practices for automakers to enhance vehicle cybersecurity and protect against cyberthreats	US	Automakers, cybersecurity teams, and regulatory bodies overseeing vehicle safety

Standard or regulation	Implication	Country or region	Affected entities
NIST IR 8473: cybersecurity framework for EV fast charging	Establishes a cybersecurity framework for securing extreme fast charging infrastructure for EVs	US	EV charging network providers, infrastructure developers, and cybersecurity firms
UK EV smart charging regulations	Regulate smart EV charging infrastructure, ensuring cybersecurity and grid stability	UK	EV manufacturers, charging station operators, and energy grid managers
UN R155: extension to motorcycles and scooters	Expands UN R155 cybersecurity requirements to include motorcycles and scooters	Global (UNECE member countries and regions)	Motorcycle and scooter manufacturers, suppliers, and cybersecurity teams
GB 44495-2024: automotive cybersecurity	Sets cybersecurity requirements for automotive systems in China to mitigate cyberthreats	China	Automakers, software developers, and component suppliers operating in China
GB 44496-2024: software update regulations	Defines software update security protocols for automotive systems to prevent unauthorized modifications	China	Automakers and software providers ensuring compliance with China's software update security mandates
ISO 24882: cybersecurity in agriculture	Ensures cybersecurity standards for agricultural vehicles and autonomous farm machinery	Global	Agricultural vehicle manufacturers, cybersecurity professionals, and farmers using connected machinery
ISO 21448: autonomous and functional safety	Defines safety measures for autonomous vehicles, focusing on minimizing unintended system failures	Global	Autonomous vehicle developers, AI researchers, and automotive safety regulators

Table 7. Key established and emerging cybersecurity standards and regulations, and their basic details




Figure 19. Key established and emerging automotive cybersecurity standards and regulations, and their associated countries or regions



CHAPTER 3

Security Highlights

Notable events like Pwn2Own Automotive and Automotive CTF uncovered new vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of further discovery. Meanwhile, compelling case studies and insights from the cybercriminal underground revealed evolving attack tactics, suggesting that there is a lot more beneath the surface when it comes to automotive cyberthreats.

Pwn2Own Automotive

Pwn2Own Automotive is the world's largest zero-day vulnerability discovery contest. Co-hosted by VicOne and Trend ZDI, with Tesla as the title sponsor, this high-stakes contest exposes critical security risks in the automotive industry.³⁸ It brings together top security researchers to identify vulnerabilities in modern automotive systems, highlighting the challenges and opportunities in securing connected vehicles and their associated infrastructure.

Takeaways From the First Pwn2Own Automotive Contest

Pwn2Own Automotive debuted in 2024 in Tokyo, Japan, and featured 51 challenges across four categories: Tesla systems, EV chargers, IVI systems, and operating systems. A total of 17 teams from around the world joined the competition, with the Synacktiv team from France emerging as the overall winner and claiming the coveted title of "Master of Pwn."

Tesla Attacks at Pwn2Own Contests Get More Sophisticated

Zero-Click Attack via TPMS

A flaw in Tesla's tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) can allow attackers to perform a zero-click out-of-bounds write, taking control of a critical electronic control unit (ECU) and potentially compromising vehicle functions without user interaction.⁴⁰

The inaugural contest's most significant impact was the discovery of 49 unique automotive zero-day vulnerabilities, which surpassed the total number of automotive zero-day vulnerabilities discovered throughout all of 2023. The event provided the automotive industry with valuable insights and the opportunity to rectify these security flaws.³⁹

Tesla Systems

During the contest, Synacktiv succeeded in two notable attempts against Tesla systems. One of their standout attempts involved a three-bug exploit chain targeting Tesla's modem. This attack exploited a race condition issue between "firewall" and "QCMAP_ConnectionManager" during the connectivity card's startup process, ultimately resulting in arbitrary RCE.

The Synacktiv researchers also executed a two-bug exploit chain against Tesla's infotainment system. They leveraged a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in Ofono, open-source telephony software designed to handle mobile network communication, and used advanced techniques like heap shaping and return-oriented programming (ROP) to exploit the flaw.⁴¹ By bypassing the XPIN security module through a memory mapping bug, they gained the ability to modify network configurations and forward packets through the IVI system to Tesla's security gateway — successfully circumventing sandbox protections.

Notably, Synacktiv's two attempts against Tesla's systems required advanced techniques and the chaining of multiple vulnerabilities for successful exploitation. These sophisticated attacks underscored the robustness of Tesla's cybersecurity measures and highlighted the value of its proactive approach to security.

This should not be a surprise as Tesla has consistently participated even in other Pwn2Own contests, demonstrating its openness to engage with the security research community. By getting involved in zero-day vulnerability contests, Tesla has shown that transparency and collaboration are key to building more secure systems. Other automotive manufacturers should follow Tesla's lead, participating in similar initiatives to identify and address potential security risks before they could be exploited.

EV Chargers

EV chargers emerged as the low-hanging fruit for security researchers, accounting for more than half of the vulnerabilities discovered. These vulnerabilities, which ranged from stack-based buffer overflows to improper input validation, were also relatively easy to exploit.

Vulnerabilities in EV Chargers Can Be Mere Stepping Stones to Exploit Other Systems

From Device Takeover to Grid Disruption

By leveraging CVE-2024-23938, attackers can inject and execute arbitrary code, gaining unauthorized control over the charging system. This allows them to execute malicious commands remotely, altering charging parameters to damage chargers or vehicles. On a larger scale, mass exploitation could simultaneously activate chargers, overloading the power grid.⁴²

Hard-Coded Credentials as a Backdoor

CVE-2024-23958 arises from hard-coded credentials left in the system, originally intended for development but mistakenly retained in production. Attackers can exploit this oversight to bypass authentication, remotely control charging systems, and potentially cause charger and vehicle damage or grid overload.⁴³

We also observed that several EV chargers exhibited alarmingly weak security reminiscent of devices from the 1990s. They lacked fundamental protections such as data execution prevention (DEP), address space layout randomization (ASLR), and buffer security checks — now standard features in modern operating systems. This glaring lack of basic defenses underscored the need for manufacturers to adopt modern security practices to safeguard EV infrastructure.

IVI Systems

Although the IVI systems category saw fewer attempts than the EV chargers category, all three IVI targets were successfully exploited. As central hubs for vehicle connectivity and functionality, IVI systems go beyond entertainment and navigation — they also present potential entry points for cyberthreats. Just as EV charger vendors need to prioritize modern security features, IVI system manufacturers need to implement essential protections such as input validation, memory protection, and buffer security checks to address risks. Considering that a vehicle's infotainment system is one of its most accessible features and most apparent attack surfaces, its security is essential to the security of the whole vehicle.

A Look at IVI System Vulnerabilities

RCE Vulnerabilities in Tesla's IVI System

Attackers can exploit RCE vulnerabilities in a Tesla infotainment system to execute malicious code remotely, potentially taking over the vehicle communication system.⁴⁴

A High-Severity Zero-Click Bluetooth RCE Flaw

As shown by CVE-2024-23923, Bluetooth's inherent complexity makes it a preferred attack vector.⁴⁵

More Than Playing Doom

Researchers exploited CVE-2024-23961, a command injection vulnerability, in an IVI system. By running Doom on the device, they showed how attackers could execute unauthorized commands if input validation is insufficient. Once root access is gained, attackers could cause far more severe damage beyond playing the popular video game.⁴⁶

Operating Systems

Of the three targets in the operating systems category, only Automotive Grade Linux was successfully exploited. It was successfully exploited by two teams, one of which was Synacktiv, using a three-bug exploit chain.

It is worth noting that both teams' attempts involved leveraging memory leak vulnerabilities, which were more complex to exploit than the more straightforward issues found in the EV chargers category. Most automotive operating systems are developed from other existing operating systems. As a result, they might have a better foundation and demonstrate stronger security than EV chargers.

Preliminary Highlights From Pwn2Own Automotive 2025

Pwn2Own Automotive 2025, also held in Tokyo, brought together 21 teams from 13 countries, who made 50 attempts over three days. Like the first edition, this year's contest resulted in the discovery of 49 unique automotive zero-day vulnerabilities.⁴⁷

Sina Kheirkhah from Summoning Team, now famous for “rickrolling”⁴⁸ the Ubiquiti Connect EV Station two years in a row, was crowned the new Master of Pwn. He dominated the contest with an impressive streak of successful exploits that uncovered 14 vulnerabilities.

As the full details of this year’s discoveries will remain undisclosed for a designated period to give automotive manufacturers and suppliers sufficient time to address them, here are some preliminary highlights:

- For the second consecutive year, EV chargers accounted for more than half of the discoveries, followed closely by IVI systems. The operating systems category saw only one successful attempt, while none were made in the Tesla systems category. It is worth noting that Tesla’s systems, which had been known to be quite robust, were already exploited three times in 2024: twice at the inaugural Pwn2Own Automotive contest and once more at Pwn2Own Vancouver 2024.⁴⁹
- Notable EV charger exploits had “add-ons” that demonstrated how vulnerabilities could manipulate the protocol or signals transmitted through the charging connector or even originate from it. The add-ons, which were new to this category, emphasized a critical point: Exploit chains could extend to and from charging devices. Cybercriminals could use these vulnerabilities as mere stepping stones to compromise vehicles and connected systems.
- The top vulnerabilities, in no particular order, were stack-based buffer overflows, heap-based buffer overflows, and operating system command injection.

A Wake-Up Call for Automotive Cybersecurity

The vulnerabilities discovered at the Pwn2Own Automotive contests have profound implications for the automotive industry. Their broad spectrum has shown that vehicles’ security and associated infrastructure are not as robust as many might believe. These weaknesses across vehicle systems, infrastructure, and foundational software reveal significant security gaps that could lead to cascading effects if left unaddressed.

They underscore that cybersecurity is no longer optional for connected vehicles. In a world where vehicles are increasingly interconnected and heavily reliant on digital systems, these findings emphasize the need for comprehensive automotive cybersecurity practices to be integrated into the development lifecycles of both OEMs and suppliers.

Automotive CTF

VicOne, in partnership with Block Harbor, held Automotive CTF 2024, a global capture-the-flag (CTF) competition designed to sharpen the skills of cybersecurity professionals across all experience levels and serve as an entry point for beginners into the automotive cybersecurity field.⁵⁰

The virtual qualifying rounds took place from Aug. 24 to Sept. 8, alongside a Japan edition, the inaugural Automotive CTF Japan. Co-organized with Mitsubishi Research Institute (MRI) and commissioned by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan, Automotive CTF 2024 Japan concluded on Sept. 13. Team ierae, the only team to solve all challenges, secured first place while TeamONE claimed the second spot.⁵¹

Out of the total 546 teams in the qualifying rounds, six teams, including the top two teams from the Japan leg, advanced to the global finals, held during the 8th Annual Auto-ISAC Cybersecurity Summit in Detroit, Michigan, USA. They were given eight hours to “capture the flag” or solve challenges, which were more complex than those in the qualifiers.

Some challenges involved the Resistant Automotive Miniature Network (RAMN), Toyota’s credit card-sized electronic control unit (ECU) testbed, while others covered NFC, RFID, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). The contest finalists also tackled “Blue Team” challenges, simulating the role of a vehicle security operations center (VSOC) analyst. These challenges were based on xNexus, VicOne’s next-gen VSOC platform.

With 15 out of 20 challenges solved, Team greaterthan, composed of Greg Hogan from the US and Robbe Derks from Belgium, emerged as the Automotive CTF 2024 champions.⁵²

More than capturing flags or identifying weaknesses in simulated vehicle systems, Automotive CTF provides a platform for uncovering automotive zero-day vulnerabilities and developing a skilled talent pool to strengthen the industry’s defenses against evolving cyberthreats in connected vehicles.

Automotive Cybersecurity

Case Studies

While we have explored vulnerabilities within vehicle systems, cyberthreats extend far beyond the vehicles themselves, affecting other aspects of the automotive ecosystem such as fleet operations, cloud infrastructure, and supply chain networks. In this section, we tackle two real-world case studies — one on fleet management breaches and another on cloud back-end system hacks — to illustrate how cyberattacks can disrupt the entire automotive ecosystem.

Modern Fleet Management and ELDs

In 2017, the US Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) mandated that all trucks nationwide install electronic logging devices (ELDs) to address concerns about truck drivers exceeding regulated work hours.⁵³ ELDs record vehicle routes, driving time, fuel consumption, and engine diagnostics, providing information that helps drivers monitor their vehicles and fleet operators optimize their assets.

Over time, ELDs gained widespread adoption in other countries as well. However, recent studies have revealed hidden vulnerabilities in these devices, raising concerns about fleet management security.

One key study, “Exploring the Risks in Connected Fleets: A Study of Two Real-World Cases,” presented at the ESCAR 2024 conference, demonstrated how unsecured devices could cause significant damage to fleet operations.⁵⁴

Another noteworthy study, “Compromising an Electronic Logging Device and Creating a Truck2Truck Worm,” presented at the DEF CON 32 hacking conference in 2024, showcased how attackers could exploit an ELD from another vehicle simply by driving alongside it. Researchers also simulated a wormlike malware attack, which could spread across multiple ELDs, potentially compromising entire fleets.⁵⁵

Additionally, VicOne’s research on fleet management platform back ends highlighted how authentication and API security weaknesses could expose fleet management systems to cyberthreats.⁵⁶

Country of operation	Has cleartext password in URI	Uses non-HTTPs login	API content
Brazil	Yes	No	
Bulgaria	Yes	Yes	Payment details
Hungary	Yes	No	GPS coordinates, speed, ignition status, device ID
Hungary	Yes	Yes	Boolean
India	Yes	No	"Requires authentication"
India	Yes	No	"Requires authentication"
Japan	Yes (Base64 password)	No	"Requires authentication"
Poland	Yes	No	GPS coordinates, device ID, ignition status, speed
Poland	Yes	No	"Requires authentication"
Poland	Yes	No	Several device IDs and names
Poland	Yes	Yes	
Romania	Yes	No	Several device IDs, ignition status, speed, GPS coordinates
Serbia	Yes	Yes	Variety of field names
Thailand	Yes	Yes	JSessionID
US	N/A (Base64 password reset)	N/A	"Requires authentication"
US	Yes	Yes	GPS coordinates, speed, complete address, odometer
US	Yes	No	"Requires authentication"

Table 8. Companies with exposed vehicle tracking systems labeled based on their country of operation

These studies underscore an important point: Fleet management must rapidly adapt to evolving cybersecurity challenges. While technologies like ELDs help improve efficiency and compliance, they also introduce new security risks that cannot be overlooked. Fleet operators must implement robust cybersecurity measures, regularly update and patch their systems, and stay informed about potential vulnerabilities to safeguard assets, operations, and driver safety.

VIN-Based Vehicle Hijacking

In June 2024, security researchers disclosed a set of vulnerabilities in an OEM's digital infrastructure that could allow malicious actors to remotely control the critical functions of any affected vehicle with only a license plate number as a basic requirement. These vulnerabilities, which were patched by the OEM in August and affected vehicles manufactured by the OEM after 2013, raised serious concerns about the cybersecurity of modern connected cars.⁵⁷

The vulnerabilities stemmed from security gaps in the OEM's dealer portal and the API connecting apps with a vehicle's internal systems. By exploiting these weaknesses, attackers could impersonate a dealer and, after using a vehicle's license plate number to resolve its vehicle identification number (VIN), gain access to a trove of sensitive information — including customer data (names, phone numbers, and email addresses) and real-time vehicle location data — and the ability to remotely control various car functions.




Figure 20. Potential VIN-based vehicle hijacking attack chain

The researchers even created (but did not publicly release) a smartphone-based tool to fully automate the attack. Alarmingly, the entire attack could be carried out in just 30 seconds, regardless of whether the target vehicle had an active subscription to the OEM's infotainment and telematics service.

If VINs and PII were exposed in a data breach, malicious actors could exploit the vulnerabilities to remotely access or even steal affected vehicles, particularly those with unpatched systems. This underscores the importance of keeping vehicle software up to date for OEMs and users alike and the need for users to exercise caution when sharing VINs or personal information.

This type of attack is not limited to this specific OEM. At GeekCON 2024 China, researchers demonstrated a VIN-based method using a similar design flaw to hijack a vehicle from a Chinese manufacturer.⁵⁸ Much like identifying a firewall or VPN vulnerability, discovering one such weakness in a vehicle suggests similar risks might exist across other manufacturers.

Automotive Cybercrime and the Underground

VicOne continuously monitors automotive-related discussions on underground forums across the dark web and the deep web to gather threat intelligence and anticipate emerging cyber risks. Our scanning of these forums reveals the constantly evolving tactics that attackers use to exploit vulnerabilities in modern vehicles, indicating that car theft has advanced far beyond traditional mechanical tools for breaking into locked vehicles.

From Exploits to Espionage: Cyberthreats Circulating in the Underground

Table 9 summarizes key automotive-related findings from underground forums across the dark web and the deep web, providing a clearer picture of the threats circulating within cybercriminal networks.

Category	Details	Why they matter
Vehicle exploits and vulnerabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Zero-day vulnerabilities• Remote exploit kits• CAN bus manipulation• OTA update hijacks	Exploits can enable theft, sabotage, or unauthorized control.
Hacking tools and tutorials	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Car hacking kits• RFID/NFC cloning tools• Reverse-engineering guides	These lower entry barriers for attackers and increase risks of exploitation.
Connected vehicle and IoT device exploits	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Telematics device manipulation• Infotainment system exploits• Mobile app vulnerabilities	Weak security in IoT devices and apps can expose vehicles to remote attacks.
Corporate espionage and insider threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Insider leaks• Supply chain weaknesses• Executive data leaks	Insider threats bypass traditional security measures.
Leaked corporate credentials and access data	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Employee login credentials• Admin access to telematics portals• Supplier/Vendor portal access	Unauthorized access can disrupt operations and enable theft of sensitive data.
Stolen intellectual property and proprietary data	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Blueprints and design files• Firmware and software source code• R&D data• Supplier and partner data	These could lead to higher risks of counterfeit parts, compromised software, and loss of competitive advantage.
Stolen data markets	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Customer data dumps• Fleet vehicle tracking data• License plate and VIN spoofing	Data breaches damage trust and might lead to regulatory penalties.

Table 9. Overview of automotive cybercrime discussions observed in underground forums

Why Is Monitoring the Underground Important?

Monitoring underground forums across the dark web and the deep web provides critical insights into emerging threats, helping organizations strengthen cybersecurity defenses. Key benefits include:

- **Proactive threat intelligence:** Identify vulnerabilities before exploitation, allowing for preemptive security measures.
- **Early incident response:** Detect compromised credentials, leaked data, and stolen-vehicle access tools before they are widely exploited.
- **Strategic risk management:** Track evolving attack trends and cybercriminal tactics, helping to refine defense strategies.
- **Supply chain security:** Uncover weak points in vendor systems, mitigating third-party risks in the automotive ecosystem.

A View From the Underground: The Evolution of Car Theft

Car thieves have continuously adapted to advancing vehicle security measures, shifting from mechanical break-ins to high-tech cyber-enabled theft methods. In the past, they used tools like hooks and upholstery removers to physically bypass locks. However, as keyless entry systems became more common, they evolved their tactics to become more subtle and sophisticated.

Thieves started using relay attacks, where they tricked vehicles into thinking the key fobs were nearby, allowing them to unlock and start the cars without physical access to the keys. This method is still being used in many cases today.

Another notable method was popularized in the notorious “Kia Boys” cases, where perpetrators exploited a lack of engine immobilizers in certain Kia and Hyundai models, hotwiring vehicles by manipulating power steering components.

However, the past year saw a surge in a more advanced technique known as CAN injection. This method involves directly accessing a vehicle’s CAN bus to bypass security measures and take control. We have observed numerous discussions and frequent sales of CAN injections tools on underground forums, suggesting that this approach is gaining popularity among cybercriminals.




Figure 21. Evolution of car theft tools

Modern theft tools go beyond merely unlocking a car. Some can disable alarm systems specific to certain vehicle manufacturers, making unauthorized entry difficult to detect. To counter modern tracking measures, criminals frequently use GPS spoofing technology, preventing stolen vehicles from being easily located and recovered.

Tool	Frequency (MHz)	Technology used	Price (US\$)
Easy Tool Ivaylov HU101 mechanical locks	N/A	Mechanical lock picking	\$455 – \$585
Pandora Phantom code grabber (standard)	315, 433, 434, 868	Radio signal capturing and decoding	\$4,300
Keyless Go repeaters/ FBS4	868	Radio signal capturing and amplifying	\$4,000 – \$15,000
Pandora DXL 5000 new update 2024	315, 433	Radio signal capturing and relaying, immobilizer bypass	\$5,800 – \$6,800
D.A Smart FCA complete range (alarm disabler via OBD2)	N/A	ODB2 port manipulation	\$650
Mini GPS satellite signal blocker/jammer	1,500 – 1,600	GPS jamming	\$6.99 – \$8.99
Key programmer/ Immobilizer bypass	N/A	Key programming, immobilizer bypass	\$6,890

Table 10. Tools used in car theft, including for evading detection

In addition to purpose-built hacking tools, legitimate maintenance and repair devices have been misused for vehicle theft. For example, the Autel MaxiIM KM100, originally designed to help vehicle owners or mechanics create replacement keys, has been repurposed by criminals to reprogram vehicle keys after gaining unauthorized entry to vehicles typically by breaking the windows. While these tools serve legitimate functions, their exploitation for illegal activities underscores the persistent challenges in maintaining automotive security.



CHAPTER 4

Automotive Cybersecurity Recommendations and Predictions

As advances in mobility shift into high gear, so too must the industry's approach to automotive cybersecurity. With vehicles becoming increasingly connected and autonomous, cybersecurity can no longer be treated as an afterthought — it must be a foundational pillar in ongoing and emerging developments. The integration of advanced technologies such as AI, cloud connectivity, and centralized ECUs presents both new opportunities and critical risks. In this section, we summarize key challenges and outline proactive strategies to ensure that cybersecurity becomes — and remains — a core component of protecting vehicles, infrastructure, and data.

Recommendations: Strengthening Automotive Cybersecurity in a Connected World

From OEMs to suppliers, every stakeholder plays an important role in fortifying defenses and closing security gaps. We outline key strategies to strengthen automotive cybersecurity, providing actionable steps to address pressing challenges and emerging threats highlighted in this report.

Enhance cybersecurity across the automotive supply chain.

A secure and connected automotive ecosystem requires collaboration. OEMs and suppliers must unify security standards and regulations, assess vendors thoroughly, and share threat intelligence. Continuous monitoring of credentials, firmware, and software, and secure development practices are crucial.

Reinforce advanced automotive technologies with security and safety.

Advanced vehicles with features like autonomous driving require robust security. This means securing ECUs, encrypting communication, and validating software updates. Additionally, AI-powered anomaly detection can identify potential cyberattacks or malfunctions. Security should be integrated from design through threat modeling, strong authentication, and prioritizing safety-critical systems with redundancy.

Improve data transparency and privacy.

The increasing volume of automotive data necessitates robust and transparent data governance. This includes tracking data lineage, maintaining accurate logs, anonymizing data where possible, and implementing strong security measures like encryption and secure storage to ensure data integrity and provenance. Clear policies and procedures, transparent communication with vehicle owners about data usage, and compliance with privacy regulations (such as GDPR and CCPA) are essential for maintaining consumer trust.

Secure against data theft and privacy breaches.

SDVs generate and store extensive customer data, including location history, driving patterns, biometrics, and personal preferences. Cyberattacks on vehicles or associated cloud platforms could lead to data theft, identity fraud, or misuse of sensitive information.

Prepare for third-party integration risks.

SDVs often integrate with third-party applications or external systems, such as smart homes, charging networks, and fleet management platforms. Weaknesses in third-party APIs or systems can serve as entry points for attackers to compromise vehicles, steal data, or disrupt operations.

Predictions: Navigating the Future of Automotive Cybersecurity

As the automotive industry continues to embrace advancements such as AI, autonomous driving, and cloud connectivity, the race to outpace cyberthreats intensifies. Every technological breakthrough introduces new vulnerabilities, reinforcing cybersecurity as a critical priority. In 2025, the evolution of SDVs will continue to reshape the security landscape, with innovation and cybersecurity often introducing complexities that must be managed in parallel. We examine the key challenges and corresponding predictions for 2025, highlighting how the push for innovation will intersect with emerging security risks in connected and autonomous vehicles.

Platform Standardization: A Risky Efficiency Will Escalate Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

Efforts to standardize vehicle platforms streamline production and improve compatibility, but they also introduce systemic vulnerabilities. A single flaw in a widely used system can ripple across multiple manufacturers, affecting millions of vehicles. Supply chain vulnerabilities, such as unpatched flaws in components like ECUs, will remain a significant concern. Attackers will exploit these weaknesses by embedding malicious code during production, creating hidden backdoors for large-scale cyberattacks.

AI Systems: Vulnerabilities Will Be Exploited in AI and Third-Party Apps

AI-powered technologies, including chatbots and voice assistants, are becoming increasingly integrated into vehicles, enhancing convenience and user experience. However, these advancements also present attackers with new opportunities for exploitation. Vulnerabilities in AI systems will enable attackers to issue unauthorized commands, manipulate responses, or extract sensitive information through vehicle chatbots. Additionally, third-party apps, such as payment systems, smart home integrations, and navigation services, will serve as entry points for cyberattacks, exposing user data and vehicle controls to potential exploitation.

Beyond ECU Consolidation: The Risk of Network-Based Attacks Will Grow

The shift from multiple distributed ECUs to centralized architectures improves computational efficiency and lowers costs. However, network-based vulnerabilities will continue to be a growing concern. Ethernet-based systems will be prone to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks due to incomplete encryption, allowing hackers to intercept and alter vehicle communications. While ECU centralization will present its own security challenges, MITM attacks will arise primarily from network design rather than system consolidation, with successful attacks likely to endanger safety by compromising critical vehicle functions.

Cloud Connectivity: Cloud Systems Will Be the New Battleground for Cyberthreats

Cloud platforms enable real-time data processing and software updates for SDVs. However, as reliance on cloud-based infrastructure grows, so does its appeal as a high-value target for cybercriminal activity. Attackers will gain control of back-end cloud platforms to disrupt services across fleets of vehicles and cause data breaches exposing sensitive user information at an unprecedented scale.

Autonomous Driving: Risks of Manipulation and System Exploits Will Heighten

AVs rely heavily on sensors such as cameras and lidar to interpret their surroundings and make real-time driving decisions. Attackers will manipulate these systems to mislead vehicle decision-making processes. False sensor inputs will cause vehicles to misinterpret their environments, resulting in accidents or critical system malfunctions. Attackers will exploit system vulnerabilities to target high-value or mission-critical fleets.

Payment and Charging Systems: Hotspots for Cybercrime Will Enable Increased Targeting

While in-vehicle payment systems and EV charging infrastructure are essential for modern mobility, they also introduce new opportunities for cybercriminals. Attackers will exploit payment systems to steal financial information, intercept transactions, or manipulate billing processes, potentially leading to fraud and unauthorized charges. Meanwhile, vulnerable EV charging stations will be used by attackers to access in-vehicle systems, enabling cyber intrusions, or disrupt charging operations, causing inconvenience for users and affecting grid stability.

OTA Updates: Essential Mechanisms Will Become Major Attack Vectors

OTA updates are essential for keeping vehicles secure and functional, but poorly secured mechanisms can open the door to attacks. Attackers will exploit weaknesses to push malicious updates, potentially disabling vehicles, compromising safety-critical systems, or introducing persistent backdoors. Disruptions to OTA processes — whether through DoS attacks, supply chain compromises, or flawed update deployments — will leave fleets vulnerable to widespread security breaches.

As the automotive industry evolves through increasing digitalization, the complexities of its supply chain and the volatility of its cyberthreat landscape amplify the stakes for cybersecurity.

While technological advancements drive efficiency and innovation, they also introduce new risks that the industry might not be prepared for — or indeed even be aware of. A single breach can have far-reaching consequences, disrupting entire networks and exposing vulnerabilities across the automotive ecosystem. This reality underscores the urgent need for robust, collaborative defense strategies to safeguard vehicles, infrastructure, and data in an increasingly connected world.

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